We examine how a great power's past behavior toward an informal security partner affects the broader credibility of its security commitments, focusing on the implications of America's dramatic troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 as perceived by the U.S., South Korean, and Chinese publics. Against conventional wisdom, we show that knowledge about a great power's decision to abandon an informal partner in one region of the globe can help increase confidence about its alliance commitments elsewhere. Our survey experiments identify a striking disjuncture: Although Americans tend to believe that the abandonment decision in Afghanistan will hurt their country's credibility in East Asia, no such effect is found in South Korea and China. In fact, East Asian respondents who are reminded of the Afghanistan withdrawal become more confident about American security commitments when alerted to the possibility that this decision will help Washington to concentrate additional military capabilities in their region.

How robust is public support for extended nuclear deterrence in patron and client states? Recent studies have improved scholarly understanding of US public opinion about nuclear weapon use against non-nuclear adversaries. Yet, there is limited knowledge of public attitudes regarding retaliation for nuclear strikes against US allies. We develop a theoretical typology of nuclear crises and investigate this phenomenon with a novel survey experiment ( n = 6,623). Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans viewed realistic emergency alert messages about a most-likely case for nuclear retaliation: a North Korean missile attack on a US ally protected by the nuclear umbrella. Support for nuclear retaliation is low in all three countries, with important cross-national differences. Favorability increases with North Korean nuclear first-use, but it remains limited nonetheless. Surprisingly, US “tripwire” troop casualties do not increase Americans’ demands for nuclear retaliation. These findings have important implications for the study of nuclear crises and practice of extended deterrence.

We examine how a great power's past behavior toward an informal security partner affects the broader credibility of its security commitments, focusing on the implications of America's dramatic troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 as perceived by the U.S., South Korean, and Chinese publics. Against conventional wisdom, we show that knowledge about a great power's decision to abandon an informal partner in one region of the globe can help increase confidence about its alliance commitments elsewhere. Our survey experiments identify a striking disjuncture: Although Americans tend to believe that the abandonment decision in Afghanistan will hurt their country's credibility in East Asia, no such effect is found in South Korea and China. In fact, East Asian respondents who are reminded of the Afghanistan withdrawal become more confident about American security commitments when alerted to the possibility that this decision will help Washington to concentrate additional military capabilities in their region.

How robust is public support for extended nuclear deterrence in patron and client states? Recent studies have improved scholarly understanding of US public opinion about nuclear weapon use against non-nuclear adversaries. Yet, there is limited knowledge of public attitudes regarding retaliation for nuclear strikes against US allies. We develop a theoretical typology of nuclear crises and investigate this phenomenon with a novel survey experiment ( n = 6,623). Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans viewed realistic emergency alert messages about a most-likely case for nuclear retaliation: a North Korean missile attack on a US ally protected by the nuclear umbrella. Support for nuclear retaliation is low in all three countries, with important cross-national differences. Favorability increases with North Korean nuclear first-use, but it remains limited nonetheless. Surprisingly, US “tripwire” troop casualties do not increase Americans’ demands for nuclear retaliation. These findings have important implications for the study of nuclear crises and practice of extended deterrence.

ABSTRACT In the field of international relations, it has long been believed that nationalism generates adverse foreign policy preferences. This article revisits this long-standing assumption by investigating how stimulating nationalistic sentiments shapes mass foreign policy preferences in two contexts, namely when celebrating national achievements and greatness with a focus on the national Self and when invoking negative historical memories in relation to a salient Other. Using a survey experiment conducted in China, which capitalized on visual stimuli drawn from real-world sources to stoke respondents’ nationalistic sentiments, this article shows that not all rises of nationalism are the same. Adverse foreign policy preferences, such as a preference for a hawkish approach, an uncompromising attitude, and a dislike for the status quo, emerge when nationalistic sentiments are stoked by invoking negative historical memories but not by celebrating general national achievements and greatness.

In Zhuangzi’s writings, the most common elements are fables. Fable, which involves telling stories by relying on something else, is a method Zhuangzi employs to convey the Dao(道) through fictional narratives. He also inserts devices to ensure these stories are not dismissed as mere nonsense. This approach is evident in the allegory of ‘Paoding Jie Niu(庖丁解牛)’ found in ‘Yangshengzhu’. Particularly, in the setup of this fable, one can glimpse realistic elements that reveal plausibility and verisimilitude.<br/> The research findings suggest that the dance of Sanglin and the music called Jingshou are not only metaphors for Paoding’s skill but also relate to the rituals of offering sacrifices to heaven. During these rituals, it was customary for the king to preside over the ceremonies and offer humans or animals as sacrifices. In this context, Paoding’s act of dismembering an ox could also be seen as part of a sacrificial ritual. Therefore, the encounter between King Wen Hui and Paoding in the allegory, along with Paoding’s act of cutting up an ox in front of Lord Wen Hui, gains plausibility. Consequently, the conclusion that King Wen Hui attains enlightenment through Paoding becomes more convincing.

Does nationalism increase the probability of international conflict? An affirmative answer has intuitive appeal: Nationalists promote force to protect their land and people from foreign threats. Research on nationalism in international conflict implicates elites, masses, and political interactions between these actors when asserting its status as a powerful force that raises the risk for interstate wars. Yet both micro- and macro-level evidence cautions against drawing broad conclusions about how nationalism affects conflict. Nationalism sometimes prompts aggression. In other contexts, nationalism produces restraint. Systematic knowledge about how nationalism relates to international conflict therefore requires answers to questions about which nationalisms promote conflict and whose nationalism matters. This article first reviews theory and evidence about nationalism’s conflict-causing potential. We discuss the microfoundations that link nationalism to foreign policy attitudes before describing research that implicates nationalism as a cause of militarized conflict. Next, we argue that understanding the complex relationships between nationalism and conflict requires theorizing the causal processes that connect various stakeholders’ nationalism to foreign policy outcomes. Moreover, research on identity content suggests that nationalism is compatible with a variety of foreign policy preferences. Throughout, we centre research that features nationalism as a principal independent variable or causal mechanism precipitating conflict. Any review about nationalism must contend with the delicate matter of conceptualization — the field contains nearly as many definitions for nationalism as articles about nationalism and war. The research we discuss variously describes nationalism as an identity, ideology, or belief, for example. For our purposes, nationalism captures a set of sentiments related to a national group and its superiority. This broad perspective centers the phenomenon implicated in international conflict research.

Abstract This chapter proposes a new theory of popular nationalism and war by investigating how popular nationalism factors into political leaders’ strategic decision to launch military aggression. It elucidates how popular nationalism creates two contrasting incentives with regard to the initiation of militarized conflict, and how those incentives, coupled with the two moderating variables—political elites’ perceived chance of victory in conflict and their domestic political vulnerability—ultimately shape a state’s decision to go to war or maintain the status quo. The chapter emphasizes two faces of popular nationalism: it can trigger interstate war, but it can also suppress the chance of military aggression and facilitate maintaining the status quo. The chapter closes by laying out a multimethod research design employing a survey experiment and in-depth case studies.

Abstract Drawing upon research in social psychology and international relations, this chapter elucidates how nationalistic sentiments shape mass foreign policy preferences. Specifically, it unpacks the common micro-level assumptions on which studies of nationalism and war have relied by examining the following questions: What are nationalistic sentiments? What psychological and cognitive traits do nationalistic sentiments have? How do they affect people’s foreign policy preferences? In what contexts do these sentiments cause adverse foreign policy preferences? Can those adverse preferences be easily reversed? The chapter closes by discussing why popular nationalism matters to political elites in their foreign policy decision-making and how they observe it.

Abstract This chapter examines how a change in the expectation of complete victory moderates the effect of popular nationalism through the Falkland/Malvinas Islands dispute between Argentina and Great Britain. Specifically, it investigates the impact of popular nationalism on Argentina’s choice between war and the status quo. This chapter shows that a country can quickly slide into war when leaders’ belief in their chance of complete victory shifts amid strong popular nationalism. Despite the public’s intense nationalistic sentiments, Argentinean leaders did not consider using force in the early phase of the territorial dispute and instead opted for the status quo. Only after the Argentinian junta was convinced of its chance of complete victory did popular nationalism have a conflict-inducing effect, sparking the Falklands War in 1982.

Abstract This chapter summarizes the central arguments and findings of the book: popular nationalism does not inevitably lead to interstate war, and it can facilitate the maintenance of the status quo. After briefly reviewing the arguments and findings from each chapter, this chapter discusses some remaining questions. It also draws several implications for the international relations scholarship and highlights avenues for future research. In addition, based on the findings, this chapter offers a number of critical policy implications to prevent wars that stem from popular nationalism. Finally, it also provides extended implications about Chinese popular nationalism and the likelihood of war in the Asia-Pacific region.